Falling in Love by Younger, Judith T.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 58 
Number 3 Teaching Trusts and Estates (Spring 
2014) 
Article 12 
2014 
Falling in Love 
Judith T. Younger 
University of Minnesota Law School, young001@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Judith T. Younger, Falling in Love, 58 St. Louis U. L.J. (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol58/iss3/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
767 
FALLING IN LOVE 
JUDITH T. YOUNGER* 
INTRODUCTION 
If you were to browse through law school catalogs or websites in the 
United States today, you would repeatedly see a course called, “Trusts and 
Estates,”1 or something akin to it.2 If you read on a little further, you would 
discover that the course is about the transmission of property from one 
generation to the next. Its component parts are: wills,3 intestate succession,4 
nonprobate transfers,5 and trusts.6 When I began law school, I knew nothing 
 
* Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family Law and 2009–10 Stanley 
V. Kinyon Chaired Teacher of the Year, University of Minnesota Law School. She thanks her 
research assistant, Daniel Sullivan Schueppert, for his invaluable help with this Article. 
 1. This is what it is called at Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School Course Catalog, 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, https://helios.law.harvard.edu/CourseCatalogs/hls-course-catalog-2013-
2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 2. Some examples are: “Wills and Trusts,” Courses 2013–14¸ UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/e0/fa/e0faefaa15cbcffe9e0d80c1703d6c87/ 
CourseAreaOfferings13-14rev-11.14.13.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2013); “Wills and Trusts,” All 
Courses, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, https://curriculum.law.ucla.edu/Guide/AllCourses/ (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2013); and “Wills and Estates,” Law School Catalog 2012–14, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
LAW SCHOOL, http://registrar.utexas.edu/docs/catalogs/law/ut_catalog_law12-14.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2013). 
 3. Wills are written documents that dispose of one’s property when he or she dies. They 
have to comply with the formalities required by state legislatures and be proven in court through a 
process called “probate.” 
 4. This is the court-supervised process of distributing a dead person’s property when he or 
she has left no will. It is called “administration” and follows a plan laid out by the state 
legislature. 
 5. These are devices like insurance policies, joint accounts, payable on death designations, 
and retirement accounts. They are asset specific and pass the property named in them on death of 
the owner to a designated successor. They do not require court supervision and thus avoid the 
probate or administration process. They are frequently called “will substitutes.” 
 6. This is the lawyer’s invention of which the great historian, Frederick W. Maitland, 
extravagantly said, “Of all the exploits of Equity the largest and the most important is the 
invention and development of the Trust.” FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF 
LECTURES 23 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 2d ed. 1936). The distinguishing feature of 
this device is that it enables separation of legal title and equitable title. Thus, if I give property to 
a trustee and direct him or her to pay income to John for John’s life and to pay the remainder to 
Mary on John’s death, the trustee has legal title to the trust property (which is the kind of title a 
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about any of these subjects and I am sorry to say that I knew nothing more 
when I graduated. Trusts and Wills were taught as separate courses then. Both 
were required at my law school, and I took them in my second year. Dean 
Russell D. Niles7 taught “Trusts,” and Professor Thomas E. Atkinson8 taught 
“Wills.” I remember them as exceptionally handsome men who naturally 
taught “in sage on stage” mode.9 The teacher holds forth and the students 
merely listen and watch. I did not listen and hardly watched; I let their 
performances float by me. Thus, not one shred of substance entered my head. I 
emerged from law school unenlightened about the delights to come. I certainly 
did not foresee that Wills, Trusts, and I would hit it off—become matches, so 
to speak—or that we would mature into loving partners in my future teaching 
career. 
My love affair with the subjects began with a series of small serendipities. 
I was in my second job out of law school and working as an associate in the 
litigation department of a Wall Street firm.10 My boss, Charles Pickett,11 lent 
my services to the head of the Estates Department for a day. “Estates is short-
handed,” he explained, “they’re having an emergency. Go over there and help 
them out.” I went across the hall to where the Estates Department began. The 
partner in charge, Charles B. Lauren,12 was in his office with the client. Mr. 
 
law court would recognize before 1536), and Mary and John have equitable title to the trust 
property (which is the kind of title the Chancellor of England, head of equity, so to speak, would 
recognize then). The trust has a life outside the Trusts and Estates course. See, e.g., John H. 
Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust As an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 
165 (1997). 
 7. Dean Niles was appointed to the deanship in 1948 and became chancellor of the 
University in 1963. He also served as president of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York. See Lee A. Daniels, Russell Niles, 90, Ex-Chancellor; Of N.Y.U. and Law School Dean, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/17/us/russell-niles-90-ex-chancel 
lor-of-nyu-and-law-school-dean.html?scp=2&sq=russell%20d.%20niles&st=cse. 
 8. He was the author of, among other works, a very useful hornbook on Wills. See THOMAS 
E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSION 
INCLUDING INTESTACY AND ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS’ ESTATES (2d ed. 1988). 
 9. See, e.g., What is Your Teaching Style?, COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.biz.colostate.edu/mti/tips/pages/WhatisYourTeachingStyle.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 
2013) (categorizing teaching styles). 
 10. Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside and Wolff, now Chadbourne & Parke, LLP. 
 11. Pickett was the firm’s chief litigator and had extensive experience in the field. He was 
frequently in court. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 261 (2d Cir. 1969); First 
Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. Aristeguieta, 287 F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1960); Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 184 F.2d 66, 67 (2d Cir. 1950); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Riggio 
Tobacco Corp., 192 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). He was not a patient man, but he 
was the best teacher I have ever had. He would return a draft memo I prepared for him with all 
the unnecessary words scissored out. Such vivid, rough lessons, one never forgets. 
 12. Lauren was head of the firm’s Estates Department. He was, unlike Pickett, an extremely 
patient man. I learned from him, too, but his teaching method was a stark contrast to Pickett’s. He 
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Lauren told me that the client was one of the beneficiaries of a large 
testamentary trust. The trustee was directed to pay trust income to others for a 
time and, later, to pay the principal of the trust to our client, the remainderman. 
The trust assets included some royalty contracts and some parcels of land in 
upstate New York. The contracts produced income but would be completely 
used up as time went on. They were thus “wasting” assets. The land did not 
produce much income. It was therefore an “unproductive” asset. The trust was 
silent about how to treat receipts from these assets, posing a difficult problem 
for the trustee. “He,” Mr. Lauren said, “must tread a prudent path between the 
successive interests in the trust. For the income beneficiary he must make the 
trust property produce income; for the remainderman he must preserve the 
principal of the trust. When the assets he administers include either 
unproductive or wasting assets, these duties conflict.” 
The client was upset because he thought the trustee was favoring the 
income beneficiaries over him in apportioning receipts from the contracts and 
the land. In some states, there was a fixed rule that would dictate the division.13 
“Unfortunately, the law in New York is muddled,” Mr. Lauren told me. 
However, he thought the client was clearly right about the trustee’s results: 
they were skewed to favor the income beneficiaries to our client’s 
disadvantage. “Find a better way,” said Lauren to me, “and justify it.” I went to 
work immediately, and by afternoon I had learned just enough to write a memo 
that satisfied him. That same evening, at home, I showed it to my husband.14 
“You could make a nice little law review article out of that—with charts,” he 
said. I took his advice, and the nice little law review article (with only one 
chart) was published in the New York University Law Review sometime 
later.15 Dean Niles saw it there. He called me and told me it made him proud. 
“Judith,” he said, “would you like to teach a section of Trusts at the Law 
School?” “Yes,” I replied; and so my teaching career began. 
The unlucky students who were in that first class knew a great deal more 
about the subject than I did. They were actuaries, insurance agents, bankers, 
and trustees. The class was technically part of the school’s evening division for 
people who maintained full-time jobs while going to law school. It met from 
6:00 PM to 8:00 PM, twice a week. The students came with bags of 
sandwiches in-hand. They sensed my insecurity and lack of knowledge on 
 
would give long, gentle explanations of arcane subjects in a quiet voice. He did not mind 
repeating himself for a novice like me and did so cheerfully until he was sure I had gotten the 
point. 
 13. See Judith T. Younger, Apportioning Receipts From Wasting and Unproductive Assets: 
A Comment on the New Principal and Income Act, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1118, 1124 (1965). 
 14. The late Irving Younger. See A.B.A., THE IRVING YOUNGER COLLECTION: WISDOM 
AND WIT FROM THE MASTER OF TRIAL ADVOCACY (2010). 
 15. Younger, supra note 13, at 1118. 
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everything except apportionment rules. Instead of mocking me, however, they 
were kind, taking over when they felt I needed help. For the next few years, I 
taught, as an adjunct, whatever courses I was asked to teach; unfortunately it 
was never the same course twice. Thus, I did not return to teaching Trusts until 
many years later when I joined the full-time faculty at Cornell Law School. By 
then, law school curricula had changed. The course I was asked to teach was 
an integrated one; it included wills, intestate succession, nonprobate transfers, 
and trusts. At Cornell it was officially called “Processes of Property 
Transmission.”16 The students called it “PPT.” The first time I taught it, I was, 
as I had been at NYU, on shaky ground. I knew I needed help and was lucky to 
get some expert advice from Professors Stanley M. Johanson17 at Texas and 
Robert S. Pasley18 at Cornell. Today, I am still in their debt. At Cornell, I had 
the luxury of teaching PPT at least once every year. Eventually, the balance 
shifted between the students and me. I came to know more than they did and 
regretted only that I had not paid attention when I had the opportunity to learn 
it all in law school. 
There are many things about this course that attach me to it.19 Here, I will 
confine myself to one: the course’s potential to show students the stark 
difference between competent and incompetent representation. It teaches that, 
for clients, choosing a lawyer is as important as choosing a mate. It teaches 
that incompetent representation can wreak havoc on a decedent’s estate. It 
teaches, as well, what good lawyers can do. They have invented the course’s 
main actors—the will, the trust, and the nonprobate transfer—and nursed them 
from infant rebel upstarts through childhood and adolescence to respectable 
adulthood. The three are now grownups, standing ready to shoulder the 
burdens of passing property from one generation to the next. Of course, 
lawyers could not have accomplished this transformation alone. It required 
 
 16. More recently, it has become “Trusts and Estates.” 2013–14 Course Offerings and 
Descriptions, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, http://support.law.cornell.edu/students/forms/current_ 
Course_Descriptions.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 17. Professor Johanson is the James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law; University 
Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of Texas-Austin. He was the author, with the 
late Jesse Dukeminier, of a highly regarded Wills and Trusts casebook. JESSE DUKEMINIER & 
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (2d 
ed. 1972). 
 18. Professor Pasley was on the faculty of Cornell Law School when I arrived there. In 
addition to giving me his copy of the Johanson casebook, he provided a constant source of 
kindness and good advice. 
 19. I use “attach” in the same sense that it is used in modern psychology. A baby uses 
“attachment behavior” to make adults love him. Attachment theory explains that an infant needs 
to develop a relationship with at least one primary caregiver for social and emotional 
development to occur normally. In the same way, I have to be “attached” to a course to teach it 
well. See JOHN BOWLBY, A SECURE BASE: PARENT-CHILD ATTACHMENT AND HEALTHY 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1988). 
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needy clients and cooperation from the courts, and sometimes legislatures. 
When presented to students in the light of their history, the will, the trust, and 
the nonprobate transfer take on the glamour of old Hollywood.20 Students are 
surprised and pleased to find such excitement in the classroom; they can revel 
in the heady past and speculate from it about the future. 
I.  THE BAD LAWYERS 
When a client consults a lawyer about an estate plan, the client is thinking 
about death; the client knows that he or she, like everyone else, will have one 
day “joined the feathered choir.”21 The client will not be able to take his or her 
property with him or her; the client has come to a lawyer’s office to try to 
control its destination after he or she dies. The client is about to execute a 
document or documents that may be the “most important” of his or her 
lifetime.22 What the client needs most for this crucial job is a skilled 
draftsperson; someone who can put his or her intent into words that will stand 
up under attack. However, there is no way the client can tell if the lawyer he or 
she has chosen is such a person. The client cannot test out the lawyer’s drafting 
skills in advance. The best that the client can do is consult, get the estate plan 
on paper, pay the bill, and hope for the best. Only after the client is dead does 
the lawyer’s product reveal its true worth. The students in the Trusts and 
Estates class and I are in attendance at the epilogue; the client, of course, is 
not. We get to see the effects of the representation, decide whether the client 
got value for the money he or she spent, whether his or her intent was 
effectuated, and whether the representation was a triumph or disaster. My 
favorite illustration of the effect of bad representation is the Rothko will case.23 
Mark Rothko was a painter.24 In his mature style, he arranged two or three 
color rectangles, one above another on the canvas—his admirers would say the 
rectangles were luminous, floating within a radiant color field.25 His critics 
 
 20. See CONNIE BRUCK, WHEN HOLLYWOOD HAD A KING (2003). 
 21. Noël Coward’s euphemism for dying coined in “In a Bar on the Piccola Marina.” 
Hear soprano Felicia Lott sing it at Lott—A bar on the Piccola Marina (Noël Coward), 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0kasR5d8gg (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). Read 
the lyrics at A Bar on the Piccola Marina (Noël Coward), INTERNATIONAL LYRICS 
PLAYGROUND, http://lyricsplayground.com/alpha/songs/a/abaronthepiccolamarina.shtml (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 22. Leon Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 88 (1958). 
 23. In re Estate of Rothko v. Reis, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977); Cf. LUCY A. MARSH, 
DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS 11 n.4 (2009) (telling us that the court papers for the Rothko will 
case filled twelve filing cabinets). 
 24. In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 293. 
 25. See Mark Rothko and his Paintings, MARK ROTHKO, www.markrothko.org (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2013). 
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would say they looked like a patch of half-stripped wallpaper instead.26 Rothko 
achieved a measure of success with his rectangles in his lifetime, but the 
success did not make him happy. He committed suicide in 1970, leaving his 
estranged wife, Mary Alice, and two minor children, Kate and Christopher, 
surviving.27 His estate consisted largely of paintings.28 Several hung, or were 
stacked, in the family’s brownstone in Manhattan, and 798 others were stored 
in the warehouse where Rothko was living at his death.29 Rothko had chosen 
Bernard J. Reis, a “close personal friend,” who “advised [him] in all business 
matters,”30 to draft his will. An accountant by profession, Reis had completed 
law school at NYU31 in the same part-time program in which I first taught 
Trusts. He had never been admitted to the bar, however.32 Rothko is supposed 
to have said to Reis, “Bernie, you know I hate attorneys, I hate going up in 
elevators. . . . Will you prepare something for me?”33 Reis, of course, should 
have said, “No,” but he did not. Instead he drafted a two-page will for Rothko, 
thus engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.34 The will, duly executed 
under Reis’s supervision and admitted to probate,35 provides us with a fine 
example of what bad representation can do to an estate and the decedent’s 
intended postmortem plan. 
Rothko gave five paintings36 to the Tate Museum in London.37 He left “the 
real estate owned by [him] at 118 East 95th Street, New York” and “all of the 
contents thereof,” as well as $250,000, to his “wife, Mary Alice.”38 The “real 
estate” was not probate property; Mary Alice and Rothko held it as tenants by 
 
 26. Rachel Campbell-Johnston, Don’t worry if you don’t get Rothko. Go to this magnificent 
show and just stand in awe, THE TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/visual 
arts/article2422968.ece. 
 27. See In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 291. 
 28. Id. at 293. 
 29. See id. 
 30. JAMES E. B. BRESLIN, MARK ROTHKO: A BIOGRAPHY 441 (1993) (quoting Reis). 
 31. Id. at 182. 
 32. Reis became certified as a public accountant and passed the New York bar exam in the 
same year. He had to support his parents and was thus not able to do the one-year of clerkship 
then required for bar admission. Instead, he started his own accounting firm. Id. 
 33. LAURIE ADAMS, ART ON TRIAL: FROM WHISTLER TO ROTHKO 182 (1976) (quoting 
Reis). 
 34. See id. 
 35. A copy appears in MARSH, supra note 23, at 269–70. 
 36. These were to be selected by the museum from those Rothko produced for the Four 
Seasons Restaurant in the Seagram Building in Manhattan. See Mark Rothko: The Seagram 
Mural Project, TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-liverpool/exhibition/mark-rothko-
seagram-mural-project (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). Rothko originally accepted the commission 
but later changed his mind. Id. 
 37. In re Estate of Rothko, 352 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1974) [hereafter called 
“the contents case”]. 
 38. Id. at 575–76. 
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the entirety.39 Thus, the will had no effect on it.40 Apparently Reis did not 
know that, but this particular mistake was harmless. Probate property or not, 
the house and land would go to Mary Alice.41 The “all of the contents thereof” 
language was harmful, however. It triggered a separate construction 
proceeding to determine whether Rothko intended the “forty-odd works” of his 
in the house to be included in “contents.”42 There were seven separate law 
firms involved in the contents case.43 They took three different positions on the 
paintings. Two executors and the residuary beneficiary, The Mark Rothko 
Foundation, argued that all the paintings in the house should go to the 
foundation.44 One executor argued that all but the paintings on the fourth floor 
of the house should go to Mary Alice and the rest to the foundation.45 Mary 
Alice argued that all the paintings in the house should go to her, and the 
Surrogate agreed.46 The attorneys’ fees attributable to this proceeding 
ultimately came out of the estate.47 
Rothko left the residue of his estate, 798 paintings, to The Mark Rothko 
Foundation.48 It was minimally described in the will as “a non-profit 
organization, incorporated under the laws of the State of New York.”49 The 
will named five directors of the foundation, three of whom, including Reis, 
were to be executors of Rothko’s estate.50 The foundation had been 
incorporated in 1969, probably for tax purposes, to control the disposition of 
Rothko’s work, and to enhance his reputation.51 Its certificate of incorporation 
was vague; it said nothing about the foundation’s purpose except that it was to 
“spend its funds ‘exclusively for charitable, scientific and/or educational 
 
 39. The Surrogate in the contents case recognized this, as well as the fact that Reis was not a 
lawyer. (“The East 95th Street real estate as a matter of fact was held as tenants by the entirety so 
it really does not pass under the will. The language of this will is not strictly that of a lawyer. It 
was drafted by one of the executors, Reis, an accountant.”). Id. at 577. 
 40. This tenancy is like a joint tenancy with right of survivorship but can exist only between 
married people. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 447 (8th ed. 2009). The surviving member of the couple takes the whole 
on the other’s death. Id. It was a nonprobate transfer; a will substitute. 
 41. See id. 
 42. In re Estate of Rothko, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 579. 
 43. This count includes the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York. Id. at 
575. 
 44. Id. at 576. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Estate of Rothko, 414 N.Y.S.2d 444, 452 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1979). 
 48. See MARSH, supra note 23, at 269. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. BRESLIN, supra note 30, at 540. 
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purposes.’”52 It, too, was a Reis product. Reis said later that he kept the 
foundation’s powers vague to give its directors greater flexibility.53 After 
Rothko’s death, the directors amended the certificate, stating the foundation’s 
sole purpose was “to provide financial assistance to mature creative artists, 
musicians, composers and writers.”54 
The drafting of this residuary gift to the foundation was Reis’s great 
mistake. When Rothko executed his will in 1968, and when he died in 1970, 
New York had a so-called “mortmain statute.”55 The statute allowed issue or 
parents of a decedent to challenge charitable gifts of more than half the estate, 
but only if they would receive a pecuniary benefit if the charitable gift failed.56 
Others had no standing. Rothko’s residuary gift to the foundation did exceed 
half his estate,57 but any challenge to it could easily have been avoided by 
skillful drafting. When Mary Alice invoked the statute on behalf of the two 
minor children,58 the court ruling on it explained how easy it would have been 
to circumvent it: 
[I]ssue can still be disinherited in favor of charity by a skilled will draftsman, 
because an issue or parent may only contest a charitable bequest if he will 
receive a pecuniary benefit from a successful challenge, either as a legatee or 
distributee. Thus an issue is deprived of standing to make an election against a 
charity if the testator makes a gift over of a failed gift to charity to some 
unrelated person.59 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 541. 
 55. Mortmain statutes were originally designed to keep land out of the hands of the church. 
A transfer of land to the church deprived the King and his lords of feudal revenues. As 
Holdsworth explained it, “If a man gave land to a religious corporation, i.e. made an alienation in 
mortmain, the lord got a tenant who never died, who was never under age, who could never 
marry, who could never commit a felony. The religious corporation suffered none of those 
incidents in the life of the natural man which were profitable to the lord . . . .” 2 W.S. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 848–49 (3d ed. 1923). More recently, in the law of 
wills, mortmain statutes restricted the power of a testator to make gifts to charities but typically 
protected only the immediate family of a decedent from disinheritance. The New York mortmain 
statute, applicable to the Rothko case, N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3(a)(1) 
(Consol. 1979), was typical. It has since been repealed. 
 56. Id. at § 5-3.3(a). 
 57. The estate’s value was said to be $5,000,000 by the Surrogate in the contents case. In re 
Estate of Rothko, 352 N.Y.S.2d 574, 579 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1974). 
 58. Mary Alice could have made her own challenge to the will as Rothko’s widow because 
he left her less than her statutory share. She could also have challenged his mental capacity to 
make the will, but she did neither. She is supposed to have said that she had enough money and 
did not want to tarnish Rothko’s reputation. See LEE SELDES, THE LEGACY OF MARK ROTHKO 
118 (1996). Mary Alice died at age forty-eight, surviving Rothko by only six months. Id. at 120. 
 59. Estate of Rothko, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1972) (citation omitted). 
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It was standard drafting practice in circumstances like Rothko’s to make the 
charitable gift and to add a clause providing that if it was void in whole or part, 
the property should go to someone other than the testator’s parent or issue. All 
it would have taken was a single sentence: “If any gift to a charity under this 
will shall be ineffective, such bequest shall go instead to my friend A.” 
Another method of getting around the statute would have been to include a 
negative bequest stating that issue and parents were completely disinherited.60 
Apparently Reis did not know about the statute or the ways to avoid it. Thus, 
the will was completely unprotected from the children, who acquired standing 
as distributees under the laws of intestacy if the charitable gift failed.61 Not 
only were they thus able to set aside half the gift to the foundation but they 
were in a position to challenge the executors’ conduct just as if they had been 
intended beneficiaries of the estate.62 
The ensuing litigation drew in the Attorney General of the State of New 
York on behalf of the ultimate charitable beneficiaries of the foundation, as 
well as Frank Lloyd, head of Marlborough Galleries.63 Lloyd was Rothko’s 
dealer and had done much to make the market for Rothko’s work.64 As a result 
of the children’s challenge, Rothko’s will was completely “broken.”65 The 
children received about half of the paintings in Rothko’s estate, including those 
the Surrogate awarded to Mary Alice in the contents litigation.66 The three 
executors Rothko named to act for him were vilified, denied commissions, 
surcharged, and removed.67 Ironically, they were replaced by Kate Rothko as 
administrator with the will annexed.68 The more than $9,000,000 in damages 
 
 60. See, e.g., In re Estate of Eckart v. Eckart, 348 N.E.2d 905, 906 (N.Y. 1976). 
 61. See Estate of Rothko, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 668. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d. 923, 931–32 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1975). 
 64. Even Surrogate Midonick recognized this, saying of Marlborough’s efforts: “[I]t must be 
recognized that [these] efforts enhanced the sales values of the paintings and accomplished sales 
at prices in excess of those obtainable in the artist’s lifetime. . . . [B]ut it cannot be gainsaid that 
the promotional efforts of Marlborough had a major effect in publicizing Rothko works and in 
creating a market for his product at higher prices, far higher than date of death values.” Id. at 955. 
Judge Nunez’s partial dissent in the Appellate Division also bears mention. He agreed with 
Midonick’s statement above and added, “Marlborough deserves much credit for creating a market 
for Rothko paintings during the artist’s lifetime.” Will of Rothko, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1977) (Nunez, J., dissenting in part). 
 65. For the notion that contesting a will is tantamount to attempting to “break” it and 
winning the contest leaves a “broken” will, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 82 (2009). 
 66. They inherited them from their mother Mary Alice who survived Rothko by only six 
months. See SELDES, supra note 58, at 120. 
 67. See In re Estate of Rothko v. Reis, 372 N.E.2d 291, 294 (N.Y. 1977). 
 68. Edith Evans Asbury, Rothko’s Daughter Gains Control of Artist’s Estate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 1976, at 1. 
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assessed69 against the executors was the equivalent of the appreciated value of 
the paintings at the date of the decree less the original sales price to 
Marlborough.70 At most, damages should have been the difference between the 
sales price to Marlborough and what the executors would have received from a 
prudent sale then.71 The foundation was reorganized so that it gave away its 
share of the paintings to various museums, most to the National Gallery in 
Washington, D.C.72 
In a separate criminal proceeding, Rothko’s dealer, Frank Lloyd, who paid 
the ultimate judgment against the executors, was convicted of forgery and 
tampering with the evidence in the children’s case.73 I met Frank Lloyd after 
the main litigation just before his own trial. Lloyd invited his lawyers and their 
families to his home on Paradise Island in the Bahamas for a weekend. The 
lawyers, including my late husband who tried the case,74 and Lloyd prepared 
for the upcoming trial while their families enjoyed the island. Lloyd was a 
marvelous host. The experience did not impair my objectivity; it only 
enhanced my enthusiasm for Rothko as a teaching case. 
The rightness of the Rothko decision is certainly a matter of dispute.75 
Essentially, the children argued that Rothko’s executors were guilty of selling 
the estate paintings to Marlborough Galleries, in which two of them were 
interested, at prices lower than they should have received.76 They argued a 
conspiracy of disloyal executors with Lloyd and Marlborough to gain control 
of the estate paintings that the children considered their entitlement.77 The 
courts treated the executors as trustees throughout.78 They and the media 
closed their eyes to all mitigating factors: Rothko himself had made similar 
sales to the gallery when he was alive, he expected his executors to continue to 
deal with Marlborough and Frank Lloyd, he knew of the two executors’ 
interest in the gallery, and he never intended his children to get half the 
paintings in his estate. Had the courts been open-minded and the defendants’ 
lawyers better, the result might have been quite different. Professor Maitland 
 
 69. In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 295; John Langbein called them “draconian.” John 
H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 665 (1995). 
 70. See In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 298. 
 71. See Richard V. Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries—Is Rothko 
Right?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 95, 112 (1978) (arguing for the rejection of Surrogate Midonick’s 
reasoning). 
 72. SELDES, supra note 58, at 350. 
 73. Despite the conviction, Lloyd avoided any jail time and his Marlborough Galleries 
continued to flourish. He was represented in the criminal case by my late husband, Irving 
Younger. See id. at 343–49 (describing the trial and the outcome). 
 74. See id. at 344. 
 75. Wellman, supra note 71, at 117–18. 
 76. Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d. 923, 945–46 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1975). 
 77. See id. at 946. 
 78. See id. at 943; In re Estate of Rothko v. Reis, 372 N.E.2d 291, 296 (N.Y. 1977). 
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has pointed out the contractual aspect of trusts.79 Professor Langbein has 
elaborated on the subject80 and applied this view of the trust directly to the 
Rothko case. Through that lens, he found that the New York Court of Appeals 
ignored a number of crucial questions that it should have asked and the 
significance of the answers: 
What was the logic of the parties’ deal? Did the two executors provoke a 
disloyal conflict, or did they pursue a course of action that Rothko tacitly 
authorized when he selected fiduciaries who came with an embedded conflict? 
At this distance from the litigation, these questions that the court did not 
ventilate are hard to answer. If, however, the contractarian basis of the trust 
deal (in this case, an estate deal) were understood, questions of this sort would 
be properly posed and investigated. Family and personal trustees often have 
interests adverse to the trust. The settlor’s determination to ask these conflicted 
persons to serve bears materially on the standard of fiduciary duty that the trust 
deal embodies.81 
Whatever side students choose on the merits of the Rothko case, they never 
dispute the fact that, if his will had been prepared by a skilled draftsperson, 
there could have been no challenge from the children and none of this would 
have happened. Sometimes they question the validity of judging the quality of 
legal representation by the performance of a nonlawyer like Reis. It is then that 
I remind them of Kaufmann,82 an undue influence case that we deal with 
earlier in the term. In Kaufmann, three prominent members of the New York 
bar earned the “bad lawyer label” for their shameful failure to fulfill their 
obligations. 
Two of them, partners in a prestigious law firm, represented the decedent, 
Robert Kaufmann, in making his estate plan.83 They knew of his homosexual 
relationship with Walter Weiss, his primary beneficiary and proponent of his 
will.84 They knew, too, that there was likely to be a contest from disinherited 
family members.85 Nevertheless, they did no advance planning to prevent a 
contest from succeeding.86 The third lawyer was a skilled litigator who 
 
 79. Professor Maitland also pointed out the fact that, in the fourteenth century, uses did not 
develop as contracts because the common law had not yet began to enforce the simple contract. 
MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 28–30. 
 80. See Langbein, supra note 69, at 625. 
 81. Id. at 666. 
 82. In re Kaufmann’s Will, 221 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (reversing a jury 
verdict of undue influence and ordering a new trial); In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (upholding a second jury verdict of undue influence), aff’d, 205 N.E.2d 
864 (N.Y. 1965). 
 83. In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 674–75. 
 84. Id. at 674–75. 
 85. Id.  
 86. See Jaworski, supra note 22, at 91. 
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represented the proponent.87 He, too, had all the relevant information but did 
not adequately prepare the proponent for his examination before trial and the 
inevitable questions the family’s lawyers would ask about proponent’s 
relationship with the decedent and his participation in the preparation of the 
will.88 Walter Weiss lied about both, denying that he had a homosexual 
relationship with the decedent or that he had participated in the planning for his 
death.89 There was ample evidence that he was lying.90 It thus became virtually 
impossible for Walter to testify at the trials without being impeached. In fact, 
he testified at neither trial and thus lost the opportunity to convince the jury 
that he and Robert had a true love relationship and that his influence was not 
undue.91 The net result was, as in the Rothko case, another “broken” will and 
unmistakable evidence that “genuine” lawyers can be as incompetent as those 
who are “false.” 
II.  THE GOOD LAWYERS 
It is much easier to talk about bad lawyers than good ones. Professional 
incompetence usually generates litigation, litigation generates court decisions, 
and court decisions are fodder for casebooks. Law students, including those in 
Wills and Trusts, thus see plenty of examples of bad lawyering. The work of 
the good lawyer, on the other hand, rarely comes to court or to the casebooks 
as such. It may turn up when a lawyer does some heroic and surprising work 
for his client92 or when the lawyer’s work is a new product, an invention, so to 
 
 87. In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 665. 
 88. See id. at 684 (noting that Weiss’s pretrial testimony was “deliberately false”). 
 89. Id. at 672, 684. 
 90. The facts are all laid out in Justice McNally’s dissenting opinion when the Appellate 
Division reversed the jury finding of undue influence at the first trial as well as in his majority 
opinion upholding the second jury finding of undue influence. See, e.g., In re Kaufmann’s Will, 
221 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605–06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (McNally, J., dissenting). 
 91. Of course, sodomy was still a felony in New York then, so there was some risk to Walter 
in taking the witness stand. He should have had the choice, however. His actions after Robert’s 
death, if he had been able to tell about them, show their relationship in a different light from what 
the jury accepted. Later, Weiss published a beautiful memorial volume to Robert as a poet and an 
artist. WALTER A. WEISS, THE WORK OF ROBERT KAUFMANN 1913––1959 (1961). A copy of 
this hard-to-find book is available at the Fine Arts Library of Cornell University. I bought a copy 
from the Minneapolis Public Library and use it in class. 
 92. See Estate of Dvorak, No. 2012P001514 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Prob. Div. Apr. 2, 2012). Jeffrey 
Waller of Spain, Spain & Varnet argued successfully that a testator’s will, insofar as it ordered 
the destruction of her surviving black cat, should be voided, and that the estate and his client, the 
executor, Third Fifth Bank, should be allowed to share the cost of maintaining the animal for its 
natural life. See also Jocelyn Heaney, Chicago Bankers, Lawyers Save Orphaned Cat from Death 
Row, TAKE PART (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.takepart.com/2012/04/05/chicago-cat-saved-death-
row-chicago-bankers. 
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speak, and the invention is in court to be tested.93 In fact, all the major players 
in the Wills and Trusts course owe much to lawyers’ inventiveness. The trust, 
the will, and the nonprobate transfer are the product of three things over the 
ages: clients’ needs, good lawyers’ efforts to fill those needs, and the sympathy 
and support of the courts.94 
If we set out to test the veracity of this statement, we should start in the 
1300s, with the “use.” It was then a vehicle for avoiding the feudal prohibition 
on wills of land,95 and the precursor of the modern trust. To create a use that 
would operate like a will, the owner of land would convey it to someone else.96 
The conveyee was not meant to enjoy it but merely to hold it for the use of the 
owner for his life and then to the use of those named in the owner’s will; the 
conveyee promised that he would do so.97 This looks like the arrangement we 
know today as a trust; there is a settlor, a trustee, a life beneficiary (who, in this 
case, is the same person as the settlor) and a remainderman. The promisor has 
no active duties. The benefit of using the use was to give the person or persons 
who had it—the original owner during his life and those named in his will after 
his death—the advantages of full ownership of the property, while relieving 
them of some of its burdens—in this case, the prohibition against willing land, 
and feudal incidents as well.98 Usually the promisors were faithful. If, by 
chance, they were not, the common law courts saw them as the owners, 
ignoring the person or persons who had the use. Even before the Chancellor 
got around to enforcing uses, Parliament saw their potential for abuse and 
acted to prevent their employment to defraud creditors or to convey land to the 
Church.99 Until the fifteenth century, there was no remedy against a faithless 
promisor. Urged to act by those who benefited from uses and their lawyers and 
deploring injustice, the Chancellor then began to enforce them.100 The use thus 
became a popular device for evading or avoiding unpopular laws.101 It is 
generally credited with the following subversive activities: undermining the 
feudal system in England, revolutionizing the law of conveyancing, enabling 
 
 93. See Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955). 
 94. Legislatures sometimes helped but also hindered. 
 95. See William F. Fratcher, Uses of Uses, 34 MO. L. REV. 39, 45 (1969). Primogeniture 
dictated that the land went automatically to the eldest son or to the nearest male heir on the 
owner’s death. Apparently, it still lives. See Sarah Lyall, Son and Heir? In Britain, Daughters 
Cry No Fair, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2013, at A1. 
 96. Fratcher, supra note 95, at 51. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Austin W. Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform, 31 YALE L.J. 457, 458–
59 (1922). 
 100. Sometimes with the cooperation of the common law judges who he called in to advise 
him. See Fratcher, supra note 95, at 53–54. 
 101. Professor Scott described the use’s activities as evasion. Scott, supra note 99, at 458. 
Professor Fratcher described them as avoidance. Fratcher, supra note 95, at 54. 
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married women to achieve economic independence, allowing daughters and 
younger sons to participate in the family wealth (land), giving some 
“corporate” protections to business enterprises, enabling gifts of large sums of 
money to charitable enterprises, and inspiring the courts to invent the 
“constructive trust” to relieve against fraudulent schemes of all sorts.102 
Henry VIII, King of England,103 sat atop the feudal pyramid and found 
himself losing revenues as a result of the widespread employment of the use.104 
He managed to forge an alliance with the common lawyers in Parliament who 
were similarly losing revenues to those who practiced in the Chancellor’s 
courts.105 Together they planned to snuff out the troublesome use. The vehicle 
Parliament chose was the Statute of Uses.106 Passed in 1536, it operated by 
converting the use into legal title recognized, and dealt with thereafter, by the 
law courts instead of the Chancellor.107 The use was thus “executed.” Henry 
soon faced a rebellion, euphemistically called the Pilgrimage of Grace.108 One 
of its causes was the Statute of Uses. The powerful landed gentry, outraged 
because they could no longer make wills of land, sided with the rebels.109 
Parliament was forced to capitulate and, accordingly, passed the Statute of 
Wills in 1540.110 The good lawyers’ invention, the will of land via the use, 
previously illegal, crossed the border into legitimacy. What happened to the 
use then? It should have been dead. It should no longer have been possible to 
separate legal and equitable titles after 1536. Professor Scott tells us that for 
about 100 years after the Statute of Uses, uses lay dormant; Professor Maitland 
confirms this.111 However “imaginative lawyers” were working to convince 
both the common law and chancery courts that the statute did not apply to all 
uses. The courts, construing the statute strictly, agreed with them and the use, 
now in trust’s clothing, revived in the seventeenth century.112 On its operation 
thereafter, Scott quotes Lord Mansfield explaining that trusts now operated 
cleanly within the law:113 “[They] are made to answer the exigencies of 
 
 102. Scott, supra note 99, at 457. 
 103. Henry VIII was King of England from 1509–47. Henry VIII (r1509–1547), THE BRITISH 
MONARCHY, http://www.royal.gov.uk/historyofthemonarchy/kingsandqueensofengland/thetu 
dors/henryviii.aspx (last visited Dec. 25, 2013). 
 104. 4 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 450 (1924). 
 105. See id. at 453. 
 106. Id. at 455. 
 107. See id. at 461–63. 
 108. Id. at 464. 
 109. 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 104, at 464–65. 
 110. Id. at 465. 
 111. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 41. 
 112. See Scott, supra note 99, at 464. 
 113. Id. Lord Mansfield was Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench from 1756–88. 
Whether we view him as a reformer or a revolutionary, he certainly had a great impact on English 
law. 
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families and all purposes, without producing one inconvenience, fraud, or 
private mischief, which the statute Hen. 8 meant to avoid.”114 And so another 
of the players in the Trusts and Estates course survived an attempt on its life, 
shed its outlaw status, and went “straight,” joining the will of land. 
In the next few hundred years, we watch as the will begins to age. Its 
formal requirements115 are strictly enforced and proving it by probate has 
become a cumbersome, expensive, and, in most cases, unnecessary court 
process. Like the executors in the Rothko case, the will and the probate bar are 
attacked and accused of, among other things, imposing a private tax and 
collecting it from the public. Like the Rothko executors, they find themselves 
unable to mount an effective defense. Ironically, leading the enemy army is a 
nonlawyer, who, like Reis, seems to have been engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.116 Norman Dacey, a mutual fund salesman, turned author and 
wrote a book titled How to Avoid Probate.117 It captured the public 
imagination, made the best-seller lists, sold millions of copies, and went 
through five editions.118 It generated wide publicity and much litigation.119 
Dacey’s cure for the evils of probate was a nonprobate lifetime transfer of 
assets to a revocable inter vivos trust.120 He told his readers they did not need 
lawyers; they could use the ready-made forms that were contained in his 
book.121 Another revolt followed. It is the twentieth century and this revolt is 
aptly described as “the nonprobate revolution.”122 Less formal methods of 
passing property down the generations, so-called nonprobate transfers or will 
substitutes, proliferated.123 Here again the inventors were good lawyers 
working for their clients, insurance companies, banks, and other financial 
institutions who were profiting from the revolution at the expense of the 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. A writing, a signature, and witnesses. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 
2010). 
 116. In Connecticut, he was held to be doing just that. See Grievance Comm. of Bar of 
Fairfield Cnty. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339, 352 (Conn. 1966). In New York, the Court of Appeals 
exonerated him. See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459 (N.Y. 1967) 
(overruling both the trial court and a divided intermediate court). Dacey went on the offensive, 
accusing the New York County Lawyers Association of depriving him of free speech. That failed 
but added to the publicity surrounding him and his book. See Dacey v. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ 
Ass’n, 423 F.2d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970). 
 117. NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE (1965). 
 118. See Richard D. Lyons, Norman Dacey, 85; Advised His Readers To Avoid Probate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1994, at 52. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See DACEY, supra note 117, at 10. 
 121. See id. at 331. 
 122. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984). 
 123. See id. at 1109. 
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probate bar. Unlike wills, these will substitutes, except for the inter vivos 
revocable trust, are “asset specific.” They apply to only one asset at a time. 
They require a writing and a signature, as do wills, but they do not need 
witnesses or probate.124 As with a will, the property owner keeps complete 
control of his or her assets during life and can freely change his or her mind 
about their disposition before death. These nonprobate devices include 
insurance contracts, P.O.D.125 designations, retirement accounts, bank, 
brokerage, and mutual fund accounts, as well as Dacey’s revocable inter vivos 
trust.126 Even after probate had been simplified in many jurisdictions in 
response to public dissatisfaction, and strict compliance requirements eased by 
curative doctrines like substantial compliance and harmless error,127 
nonprobate transfers remained fashionable and the public continued to be 
entranced by them. 
The big question, of course, was whether they would hold up when tested 
in court. Early judicial reaction was somewhat like Parliament’s thirteenth 
century view of the “use.” They seemed like attempts to evade the law of wills. 
They looked like wills and operated like wills, but they did not comply with 
the wills statutes or go through the probate process. They must therefore be 
invalid. When some courts reluctantly let them take effect, they did so only 
behind the fiction that something had been given to the beneficiary during the 
property owner’s lifetime—but what?128 In jurisdictions where the courts 
remained reluctant to validate them, the legislatures stepped in to do so.129 The 
fiction of lifetime transfers was slowly abandoned and, like the other 
inventions of good lawyers before them, these so-called will substitutes 
crossed the border to legitimacy and became accepted for what they are: wills 
that do not require witnesses or probate. 
CONCLUSION 
Our cast of lawyer inventions is now complete. The client with death on 
his or her mind, if he or she consults a good lawyer, is usually offered a 
combination solution: a package including the revocable, inter vivos, trust, the 
will, and nonprobate transfers. The revocable inter vivos trust acts as the vessel 
for linking and holding probate assets and nonprobate assets together. The 
lawyer drafts an inter vivos revocable trust for the client, reflecting the client’s 
 
 124. See id. at 1125. 
 125. The acronym for payable on death. 
 126. This is a trust that the settlor sets up in his lifetime and which he retains the power to 
revoke. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 949 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
 127. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010). 
 128. See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955). 
 129. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201 (1969) authorized them in a variety of documents and 
was widely adopted in the states. 
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dispository wishes. The lawyer supervises the transfer to the trust of the 
client’s assets while the client is still alive. Any forgotten or after-acquired 
assets the client owns at his death are caught by a separate will130 that carries 
them into the trust. Any nonprobate assets are made payable to the trust, and 
the terms of the trust govern distribution of the estate. Here are all three major 
players linked in peaceful symbiosis, their turbulent births and rebellious 
childhoods behind them. We thus have a happy resolution but not an ending. 
There will be changes: new clients, new lawyers, new inventions. I, however, 
will remain constant. “No matter what the future brings,”131 I will be firmly 
attached to this course for “the heart has its reasons, which reason knows 
nothing of.”132 
  
 
 130. Another lawyer invention called a “pour-over will.” See W.S. McClanahan, The Pour-
Over Device Comes of Age, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 163, 163 (1966). 
 131. As Time Goes By, by Herman Hupfeld from the movie Casablanca. Hear it as it was sung 
in the movie: “As Time Goes By”— Casablanca— The Original Sam (Dooley Wilson) Song, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaAqze81y4Y (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). 
 132. “Le coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point.” BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES 114 
(Dominique Descotes ed., Flammarion 2008) (1669). 
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